Lawrence Friedman: The Legal Historian and the Social Organization of Criminal Justice by Cottrol, Robert J.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 40 
Issue 4 The Scholarship of Lawrence M. 
Friedman 
Summer 2005 
Lawrence Friedman: The Legal Historian and the Social 
Organization of Criminal Justice 
Robert J. Cottrol 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert J. Cottrol, Lawrence Friedman: The Legal Historian and the Social Organization of Criminal Justice, 
40 Tulsa L. Rev. 627 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol40/iss4/5 
This Legal Scholarship Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For 
more information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN:
THE LEGAL HISTORIAN AND THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Robert J. Cottrol*
Lawrence Friedman has achieved a singular preeminence as a legal historian not
merely for having authored a body of important works in the field, but also for having, at
an early stage, articulated a new vision of legal history as a discipline. That vision was
once iconoclastic, but it has now become commonplace. He expressed this vision in
1973 in his preface to his then newA History ofAmerican Law:
This is a social history of American law. I have tried to fight free of jargon, legal and
sociological; but I have surrendered myself wholeheartedly to some of the central insights
of social science. This book treats American law, then, not as a kingdom unto itself, not as
a set of rules and concepts, not as the province of lawyers alone, but as a mirror of society.
It takes nothing as historical accident, nothing as autonomous, everything as relative and
molded by economy and society. 
1
At the time, Friedman's vision was still something quite new in American legal
historiography. At one time, legal history as a scholarly field tended to fall through the
disciplinary cracks of the American academy. Most historians regarded the field, with
the exception of constitutional history, as being too technical for historians without
formal legal training. Legal scholars had, of course, long been interested in legal history,
but their interest tended to be in what today we would regard as a fairly narrow slice of
the field: doctrinal evolution, major appellate cases, and the biographies of the great
jurists.2 Friedman was offering some relatively new insights for legal historians. Part of
Friedman's new offering was the application of social science methods to legal history.
By then, social science had a long history of involvement with legal practice and legal
* Harold Paul Green Research Professor of Law; Professor of History and Sociology, George Washington
University.
1. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 12 (2d ed., Simon & Schuster 1985) (emphasis in
original).
2. Lawrence M. Friedman, Opening the Time Capsule: A Progress Report on Studies of Courts Over Time
24 L. & Socy. Rev. 229, 230 (1990). William Novak provides a good example of this earlier approach to legal
history in his discussion of the early career of James Willard Hurst. William J. Novak, Law, Capitalism and
the Liberal State: The Historical Sociology of James Willard Hurst, 18 L. & Hist. Rev. 97 (2000). Novak notes
that Hurst's 1937 collaborative work with Felix Frankfurter on The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney,
and Waite was an example of the traditional methodology in legal history with "its focus on constitutional
doctrine and judicial personalities." Id. at 102. Hurst, of course, would move beyond that kind of traditional
historiography of American law to, in the postwar era, pioneer a much broader kind of legal history. See infra
pp. 628-29 (discussing Hurst's work).
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scholarship. The legal realists, including Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, had, of course,
long maintained that legal scholars, and indeed, practicing jurists and lawyers had to
have a familiarity with sociology, economics, statistics, and other disciplines that would
inform lawyers about the law's societal impact.3  Louis Brandeis had pioneered the
presentation of empirical evidence in legal argumentation in Muller v. Oregon4 in 1908.
The use of such evidence in constitutional cases was made more famous and
controversial in Brown v. Board of Education5 in 1954. Lawrence Friedman has noted
that there has been an identifiable "law and society movement" in American law schools
since the 1920s.
6
But, American legal historians would be somewhat slow in integrating insights
from the social sciences into their inquiries into law's past. That began to change after
the Second World War. James Willard Hurst at the University of Wisconsin School of
Law began demonstrating that legal history encompassed more than the traditional diet
of great judges and major appellate cases. 7 His writings showed the possibilities of a
legal history intimately interconnected with social and economic development in the
nation's past. In many ways, Hurst brought a social science perspective to legal history
that owed much to the school of institutional economics that flourished at Wisconsin
before the Second World War. 8 The institutionalists tended to reject the often-simplified
views of economic actors frequently found in classical (and now neoclassical)
economics, in favor of an approach to economic decision making that recognized the
complexity, and indeed, messiness of human behavior and motivations. 9 Hurst brought
3. See generally John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (UNC Press
1995). See also Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal
Orthodoxy 5, 181-83, 188-89, 209-12 (Harv. U. Press 1992).
4. 208 U.S. 412.
5. 347 U.S. 483.
6. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 763, 775 (1986).
7. Hurst discussed his approach in his 1963 preface to his study of the legal history of the Wisconsin
lumber industry:
The interplay of the lumber industry and the law in Wisconsin was such, in fact, as to yield no
large grist of "great cases" or high debates of constitutional policy. Three closely related features
characterize these materials. The legal history of the Wisconsin lumber industry resides more in
legislative and executive materials than in the Wisconsin Reports, rests about equally in "public"
and in "private" law, and in both "public" and "private" law consists more in policy developed out
of rather routinely handled instances than in policy developed in moments of drama .... "Great
cases" and constitutional debate deserve their place in the telling of legal history. But most of life is
not melodrama, and most of the reality of legal order as men experience it lies in the kinds of action
(and default) and the tone of busy practicality which prevail in the lumber industry story.
James Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in Wisconsin,
1836-1915 xi (Belknap Press 1964).
8. For a good overview of institutional economics and its methodology, see Geoffrey M. Hodgson, The
Approach of Institutional Economics, 36 J. Econ. Literature 166 (1998).
9. Hodgson shows how the institutionalists were traditionally far more concerned with empirical
examinations of actual human behavior as opposed to classical and neoclassical economists who basically
assumed rational choice and utility maximization on the part of economic actors. See id. at 168-69. It is
important for purposes of this discussion that one of the leading institutionalists in the interwar years was John
R. Commons, a major figure in the Wisconsin Institutional School. See Don Martindale, American Sociology
Before World War It, 2 Annual Rev. Sociology 121, 131 (1976). When Commons was chair of the economics
department at Wisconsin, sociology and anthropology were part of the department and did not separate until
1929. This doubtless contributed to the more holistic approach of institutional economics. Id. Commons also
[Vol. 40:627
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this perspective to the study of legal history and particularly the history of the law's role
in mediating economic activity. A critical part of the Hurstian inquiry was, as William
Novak reminds us, examining the difficult and often conflicting relationship between
historical actors and the social structures that both limited and yet made their actions
possible.
10
Lawrence Friedman would be heavily influenced by Hurst's approach to legal
history especially during Friedman's formative years as a legal scholar at Wisconsin.
l I
Friedman's works would further extend Hurst's notions of legal history as a sociolegal
inquiry, helping to move the field into new and often surprising precincts. Friedman was
able to do so, in part, because of the powerful example his own scholarship provided and
also, to use an institutional approach, because of structural changes in the historical
profession generally and in legal history more particularly. The publication of the first
edition of Friedman's A History of American Law in 1973 coincided with often
significant changes that were beginning to take place in the training of historians in
graduate history departments. Throughout the 1970s and beyond, the traditional training
of historians as humanists comfortable with language and letters was being challenged
by those who claimed that aspects of the past could be better captured through
exploitation of census schedules and the calculation of chi squares.12 If not everyone
subscribed to the new social, economic, or political histories, it was nonetheless clear
that the methodologies and concerns of the social sciences would become an integral part
of historical training and historiography. The new methodologies would co-exist, often
warily, with the more traditional, humanistic side of the discipline. This new orientation
of the historical profession would help expand the audience for what Friedman was
urging by example: a new legal history. The movement of recently trained history
Ph.D.s into teaching law in the 1980s and 1990s would also aid in the transformation of
legal historiography. These developments would not only increase the receptivity
toward Friedman's approach to legal history, but would also help transform legal history,
at least partially, into the kind of sociolegal discipline that Friedman had urged.
Friedman's approach to legal history is one that introduced us to previously
unexamined actors and institutions. While the received tradition in legal history guided
fledgling and veteran legal historians to appellate courts and the memoirs of the great
jurists, Friedman informed us that important legal decisions had also been made in more
mundane venues: state legislatures, administrative agencies, municipal courts, and
district attorneys' offices. Nowhere is Friedman's approach better illustrated than in his
work examining the history of criminal law and its administration in the United States.
Today, the history of criminal law is quite a robust field with numerous articles devoted
made considerable contributions to the study of law and labor history. See e.g. John R. Commons et al.,
History of Labour in the United States (Macmillan 1918).
10. Novak, supra n. 2, at 111-17.
II. Friedman, supra n. 1, at 13.
12. See economic historian Robert Gallman's discussion of the new social historians and their use of
quantitative methods in Robert E. Gallman, Some Notes on the New Social History, 37 J. Econ. History 3, 7-9
(1977). Social historian Tamara Hareven gives an overview of the contributions of the new social history from
its beginnings among American historians in the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s in What Difference Does It
Make? 20 Soc. Sci. Hist. 317 (1996).
2005]
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to the topic as well as specialized book-length histories of such areas as criminal
procedure, the jury, the death penalty, penitentiaries, and comparative examinations of
the history of criminal law, among other topics. This was certainly not the case in the
1970s when Friedman began exploring how social science methods might illuminate the
development of the criminal law. Although there were a number of studies examining
the criminological history of the colonial era, studies exploring the history of criminal
law and the administration of criminal justice in the post-independence United States
were still relatively new. 
13
Friedman was thus plowing somewhat unfamiliar ground when in the 1970s, he,
along with his student and collaborator Robert V. Percival, began mining the records of
the Alameda County Courthouse in order to explore the day-to-day functioning of the
kind of trial court that had previously been underexplored by legal historians. An early
product of their collaboration, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San
Benito Counties, illustrated Friedman's functionalist approach to legal history.14 A Tale
of Two Courts focused on civil litigation and had a concern, in large part, with legal
decision making as traffic management. Theirs was a concern with the changing
functions of courts over time, the extent to which an increasingly complex and
differentiated society helped bring forth more use of formal rules in resolving disputes.
15
Friedman and Percival covered the history of the two trial courts for some eighty years,
between 1880 and 1970. Their article provides a good illustration of Friedman's social
science approach to legal history. Although A Tale of Two Courts was an empirical
study, it was different from much of the new social and economic history that was
written in the 1970s. As a study it was not model bound, abstract, and heavily dependent
on the use of inferential statistics. 16 Friedman and Percival's concern was less with the
kind of narrow hypothesis testing that had, by then, overtaken much of American social
science, than it was in providing a rich evolutionary and ethnographic exploration of the
two courts. To be sure, Friedman and Percival employed social theory, but I think it is
fair to say, that they did so loosely as a way to guide and not constrict their inquiry into
the two county courts.17 Similarly, they used statistics, particularly basic descriptive
statistics, to add to their textured description of the courts.
A Tale of Two Courts revealed a social science methodology that owed much to an
earlier generation of social scientists. Friedman's approach was to bring the reader into
an intimate contact with the day-to-day workings of the Alameda and San Benito County
13. Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, The Roots of Justice: Crime and Punishment in Alameda
County, California, 1870-1910, at 5 (UNC Press 1981).
14. Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San
Benito Counties, 10 L. & Socy. Rev. 267 (1975).
15. Id. at 268-70.
16. For a good primer on the basic techniques employed in the new economic history, see Pat Hudson,
History by Numbers: An Introduction to Quantitative Approaches 191-211 (Arnold 2000).
17. Their theoretical approach, in my view, greatly resembled what sociologist Robert Merton described as
"theories of the middle range." See Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure 39 (Free Press 1968)
(emphasis omitted). Merton noted these as "theories that lie between the minor but necessary working
hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to
develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social behavior, social organization
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Courthouses. We learn from Friedman and Percival of the relative importance of actual
dispute resolution, as distinct from routine administration, and how this importance shifts
over time. In a very real sense, Friedman and Percival are bringing us a history with an
ethnographer's concern for detail. It is an approach that dominated American sociology
in the classical interwar period, but was somewhat less favored in the 1970s when
Friedman and Percival were doing their research. 
18
Friedman was able to apply his approach and the data that he had gathered from
the Alameda County Courthouse to a small article, Plea Bargaining in Historical
Perspective.19 Once again, Friedman was bringing legal history to a somewhat new and
unexpected venue. While practicing lawyers and legal scholars had long been aware of
the existence of plea bargaining, Friedman was able to give a systematic picture of the
practice from 1880, the earliest year for which he had data, forward. In doing so,
Friedman also demonstrated how his kind of empirical legal history might provide useful
information for modem policy debates. By the 1970s, crime, punishment, and deterrence
had, of course, become policy issues of national concern. Plea bargaining was seen as a
systemic flaw in the criminal justice system; one engendered perhaps by the crowded
criminal dockets of the 1960s and 1970s. Friedman's demonstration that plea bargaining
had roots well back in rural nineteenth-century Alameda County suggested that the
practice was a much more integral part of the American criminal justice system than had
been previously believed.
Friedman and Percival's explorations of the Alameda County court records led to
their book, The Roots of Justice: Crime and Punishment in Alameda County, California,
1870-1910. Their book was the first county level study of the functioning of a criminal
court in post-independence America.2 1 Here again, The Roots of Justice provides a clear
illustration of the Friedman method. The authors inform us from the very beginning that
their "book straddles two fields: American legal history and the study of law and
society." 2 2 Friedman and Percival also announce early on that the process of exploring
criminal justice in Alameda County is complex both conceptually and methodologically:
This, then, is one central argument of the book. The criminal justice system of
Alameda County, in our period, had no single function, and cannot be summed up in a
single, simple formula. A second and related point has to do with what we might call
layering. Not only was there no single function, there was, in an important sense, no single
system. Rather, there were a number of systems, each with its own job, its own process, its
own way of looking at the world and the work. The systems were arranged one on top of
another, like layers in a layer cake. At the top was the domain of the great show trials; at
18. See Martindale, supra n. 9, at 136-38. See also Charles Lemert, Social Things: An Introduction to the
Sociological Life 69-72 (Rowman & Littlefield 1997) (discussing the importance of the Sociology department
at the University of Chicago in developing a disciplined empirical and ethnographic approach to the study of
urban life).
19. Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 L. & Socy. Rev. 247 (1979).
20. Friedman & Percival, supra n. 13.
21. Id. at 9 (discussing Alameda County).
22. Id. at 15.
2005]
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the bottom, the realm of the drunks in police court; in the middle, ordinary burglaries,
thefts, and assaults in Superior Court.
23
This recognition of the court as a multi-dimensional institution contributed to both
the complexity of their inquiry and the sophistication of their result. By studying
criminal proceedings in Gilded Age and Progressive Era Alameda County, Friedman and
Percival were able to look at a corner of the law generally far removed from the great
body of national law that traditionally engaged legal historians. The cases generally
involved poor or working-class defendants, the kind who would only rarely, if ever have
the resources to bring their convictions to appellate courts and generate modifications in
legal doctrine. Federal courts had not yet begun the process of applying the criminal
procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights to the state courts. 24 The cases heard in the
Alameda County Courthouse were unlikely to disturb the federal judiciary or generate
new constitutional doctrine. Thus, Friedman and Percival were able to study the court as
a largely self-contained body. It was not totally autonomous to be sure. State appellate
courts had real, if rarely exercised, authority. But the Alameda County Court was
sufficiently self-contained to allow the authors to focus on the internal dynamics of the
court and to give the readers a good understanding of both the formal and informal
processes that determined the fate of criminal defendants.
From the beginning, The Roots of Justice contributes to our understanding of the
criminological past through its recognition of not only the organizational complexity of
the system, but the moral and legal complexity as well. Sociologists of deviance had
long been concerned with the functions of crime and deviance-the idea of boundary
maintenance. 2 5  Friedman and Percival extended that discussion by looking at the
defining of at least certain crimes less as a means of strengthening a general social
solidarity and more as a means of strengthening the hegemony of those groups who
manage to impose their view of what should be criminalized. Their discussion was an
important contribution for historians. It pointed to a way of understanding how different
activities came to be made criminal or non-criminal over time.
Alameda County between 1870 and 1890 was a small slice, geographically and
temporally, of the history of criminal law, yet Friedman and Percival were able to use
that history to discuss important, broader themes in the history of criminal justice. It was
a time and place in which crime engaged significantly less public concern and resources
than in the America of the 1970s when the authors were researching and writing.
Alameda County, at the time, was more rural and less ethnically diverse than it would be
after the Second World War. Yet, Friedman and Percival demonstrated that the records
of its criminal proceedings held important lessons for modern students of criminal
justice. In a very literal sense, The Roots of Justice provides a road map illustrating the
origins of the modern American system of criminal justice. This was a time of change.
Increasingly, the administration of justice was being placed in the hands of insiders. The
23. Id. at 14-15 (emphasis in original).
24. Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 192-95
(Duke U. Press 1986).
25. See e.g. Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method 65-69 (Free Press 1938); Kai T. Erikson,
Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance 3-29 (John Wiley & Sons 1966).
[Vol. 40:627
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police force was becoming professionalized. The role of citizen participants, grand and
petit jurors, was becoming less important. Indictment by grand jury was being largely
replaced, with few exceptions, by charges of information determined by judges.26 Trial
by jury still existed, but an increasing number of cases were being heard by judges with
sentences determined by explicit or implicit plea bargains.27 There was also a greater
use of the criminal justice system to enforce a middle class, Progressive-era view of the
moral order, or what that order should be.
Friedman and Percival exploit the universe of available sources in their effort to
illuminate every nook and cranny of the criminal court system in Alameda County. We
get arrest statistics and information from police blotters. Details of executions as
recorded by newspapers are related. Friedman and Percival present a portrait of the
criminal bar ranging from neophyte attorneys learning their craft through representation
of indigent defendants to successful criminal lawyers with decent success rates. We see
summary processes for public order offenses, public drunkenness, low-level assaults, and
similar offenses as well as the more serious procedures in felony trials. We learn, not
surprisingly, that disfavored groups-blacks, Chinese, and Irish-have higher arrest and
conviction rates than native-born whites.
28
Friedman and Percival also tell us something important about the way crime and
punishment had changed by the dawn of the twentieth century, something that was true
for Alameda County and probably even more the case in other venues. Criminal law and
the administration of criminal justice was coming more and more to reflect greater social
cleavages within the society. Increasingly, the respectable middle classes, whose mores
were represented in, and protected by the criminal law, came to view offenders less as
fallen members of the same community, and more as members of a distinctively different
dangerous class or set of dangerous classes, people in need of the monitoring and
disciplinary function of the criminal law. In this aspect of their discussion, Friedman and
Percival were exploring somewhat new territory for historians of criminal justice.
Previous histories had largely focused on rather homogenous communities in the
Colonial era. While punishment in these communities was often harsh, they nonetheless
recognized the offender as part of the community. The aim of punishment was often
designed to bring the offender back into the fold or to encourage other potentially errant
members of the community not to follow the offender's path. As Stuart Banner informs
us, even Colonial death sentences followed a prescribed ritual in which the condemned
offender had a speaking part and an occasional last minute pardon at the execution site-
all designed to foster repentance on the part of audience and offender.29 The history that
Friedman and Percival report is one where the respectable, middle-class, rule-setting
element of the community view offenders as a distinctly different class; it is a feature of
a society with more profound social divisions than had previously been examined by
American historians of criminal justice. It was, of course, more familiar to students of
racial and ethnic conflict in American history. It was territory that had certainly been
26. Friedman & Percival, supra n. 13, at 166-68.
27. Id. at 175-81.
28. Id. at 105-07.
29. Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An American History 40-43, 61-70 (Harv. U. Press 2002).
2005]
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explored by historians of slavery, as well as historians of ethnic conflict. 30 It would later
become more of a staple inquiry among students concerned with the history of criminal
law.31
The Roots of Justice stands out as a work applying social science insight to legal
history, in part due to its thoroughness, and in part due to its methodological simplicity.
Statistical evidence is used cautiously; in the final analysis its role is to bolster the
study's descriptive effort and not to make hard inferences from the data. The portrait of
criminal justice in Alameda County is not a work of grand theory, attempting to
shoehorn the untidiness of real events into a Procrustean theoretical framework. Neither
is the work a piece of narrow minded empiricism that gets us lost in the trees of the
county's criminological history without reminding us of the significance of the larger
forest. What we have instead is a detailed and intimate portrait that tells us what actually
made the criminal law function in one time and place. In doing so, Friedman and
Percival provided a template for the monographic study of the history of criminal justice
for other scholars to follow.
Many of Friedman's insights from the Alameda County study would be brought to
bear in his article written with Paul Tabor, A Pacific Rim: Crime and Punishment in
Santa Clara County, 1922.32 Santa Clara in 1922 was a good laboratory in which to test
hypotheses Friedman had developed in the Alameda study. It was during the Prohibition
era-the ultimate American effort to use the criminal law to discipline the presumed
baser instincts of the "dangerous classes." The county was ethnically diverse including
people of Italian, French, and Yugoslav descent with long traditions of wine making and
spirit distillation. 33 Prohibition had both strong opponents and defenders. Friedman and
Tabor indicate that county officials had mixed success with respect to enforcement of
California's state prohibition statute.
34
A Pacific Rim also sketches the criminal justice systems response to other crimes,
great and small. The article also allows Friedman to continue his inquiry on the erosion
of popular or communal participation in the criminal justice apparatus. He does so by
continuing to look at the impact of plea bargaining. By 1922, use of the plea bargain had
increased, further eroding the role of jury trials in determining the outcome of criminal
cases. 35 Criminal justice was becoming less a reflection of community norms, and more
a reflection of the mores and insights of criminal justice insiders. The jury trial had
previously added laymen, with their representation of community norms and biases, to
the business of deciding cases. This could add uncertainty to the criminal justice
process. But since the beginning of the twentieth century, the uncertainties of jury
30. Kenneth M. Stampp in 1956 had provided an extensive discussion of the role of criminal law as a
mechanism for the social control of slaves. See Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the
Ante-Bellum South 206-24 (Alfred A. Knopf 1956).
31. See, for example, legal historian James Q. Whitman's discussion of the influence of slavery on the
development of systems of degrading punishment in American history in Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment
and the Widening Divide Between America and Europe 173-77 (Oxford U. Press 2003).
32. Lawrence M. Friedman & Paul Tabor, A Pacific Rim: Crime and Punishment in Santa Clara County,
1922, 10 L. & Hist. Rev. 131 (1992).
33. Id. at 138.
34. Id. at 140.
35. Id. at 141-42.
[Vol. 40:627
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decision making were having less and less importance in the criminal justice system.
Instead, a small community of police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, with
perhaps an occasional contribution from social workers or others who could attest to a
defendant's psychological or social suitability, would determine what happened to
offenders. 36 Defendants could insist on their right to a jury trial to be sure. But they did
so at their peril with the likelihood of harsher sentences if found guilty. Friedman's
continuation of this discussion in A Pacific Rim informs us of a critical shift in the
history of American criminal justice.
If Friedman had simply confined his criminological histories to explorations of
California counties in the early twentieth century, he would have made an important
contribution to the history of criminal justice as a field. His explorations were both
methodologically and thematically innovative, advancing legal history generally, and
particularly the emerging field of the history of American criminal justice. Friedman
however, advanced the history of criminal justice in the United States several steps
further with his book Crime and Punishment in American History.37 Like his other two
massive explorations of the legal history of the United States, A History of American
Law and American Law in the Twentieth Century,38 Crime and Punishment is
remarkable for often providing the kind of detailed illumination of the forgotten comers
of the nation's legal history that the The Roots of Justice did for the history of one
county. Crime and Punishment tracks the subject from the earliest English settlements in
North America to the troubled early 1990s when Friedman was writing. As with his
earlier efforts, Friedman's concern is with the functions of criminal law. And in looking
at the criminal law's functioning in the past, Friedman again asks the all important
questions: Whose law? Whose order? For what purposes? And how are these ends
achieved?
By the time Friedman was writing Crime and Punishment, American legal history
in general and, indeed, the history of American criminal justice were fields that had
matured considerably. More and more legal historians had followed Friedman's
prescription to conceive of United States legal history as, indeed, a social history of
American law. There were more micro studies of trial courts done in the manner that
Friedman had helped to pioneer. There was also a greatly expanded community of legal
and social historians who had devoted their efforts to the history of criminal law and
criminal justice. Friedman was able to draw on the work of these scholars, as well as his
own previous efforts, and, of course, considerable primary research in his overview of
criminal justice in American history. His discussion of the Colonial era echoed some of
the themes he had developed earlier in A History of American Law. His readers were
reminded that although American law in the Colonial period had common law roots, the
common law, as known in seventeenth century England, was too complex and required
too much expertise to be instantly transported to the rough wilderness of seventeenth
century North America. Instead, the law, in this case the criminal law, came to America
36. Id. at 144.
37. Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History (Basic Bks. 1993).
38. Lawrence M. Friedman, American Law in the Twentieth Century (Yale U. Press 2002).
2005]
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piecemeal, and was the product of local codes; codes that were often informed by
dominant local elites and the Protestant sects that they adhered to.39 Ultimately, as the
colonies became more settled and as they eventually became states, American criminal
law would become more like the common law from which it sprang, although it would
be modified and ultimately codified.
40
Like The Roots of Justice, Crime and Punishment is concerned less with the great
cases and ensuing appellate doctrine and more with the law's application to ordinary,
indeed, anonymous people in American history. Here again, we see Friedman's concern
with those institutions that ultimately make the most difference in the day-to-day
functioning of the system. That concern takes us through some of the major themes of
the criminological history of the nation: Colonial-era stocks and the development of the
penitentiary in the nineteenth century, race and crime and vigilantism, plea bargaining,
and the enforcement of morals. Friedman brings in modem concerns: the contemporary
death penalty, drug criminalization, and gun control, among others.
Friedman provides an especially valuable analysis of one singular aspect of
American legal culture: the large amount of tolerance for extra-legal violence. He
devotes a chapter to the subject, examining such issues as the frontier tradition, the duel,
vigilantism, and lynching.4 1 These are activities that have found few parallels in modem
Western Europe or other societies with which the United States is frequently compared
and raises the difficult question of how to account for a significant degree of "American
exceptionalism" in the area of crime and justice.42 Friedman is especially valuable in
discussing issues of race and crime, whether examining lynching's history as a tool of
racial control or the dual evils of police brutality and police under protection in modem
inner city communities:
4 3
As with his other explorations on the history of criminal justice, Friedman's Crime
and Punishment does far more than provide a detailed tapestry illustrating the
functioning of criminal law in the past. Friedman also provides us with a "useable past,"
one that informs us of how we have arrived at our troubled, criminological present. I use
the term "useable past" somewhat guardedly in this context because Friedman's text, like
history itself, does not point us to any quick or easy policy prescriptions. We are all
familiar with the major criminological policy prescriptions that have been offered over
the last half century or so. Some criminological theorists have urged that the criminal
justice system should stress rehabilitation, others have urged a greater emphasis on
punishment and retribution. 44 The debate over whether the death penalty deters murder
39. Friedman, supra n. 37, at 22-23.
40. Id. at 63-65.
41. Id. at 172-92.
42. For an important discussion of "American exceptionalism" in the area of criminal justice, see Whitman,
supra n. 31. 1 have discussed the issue and argued that we should look at American exceptionalism as the
result of unique microcultures of criminal violence in the United States. See Robert J. Cottrol, Submission is
Not the Answer: Lethal Violence, Microcultures of Criminal Violence and the Right to Self-Defense, 69 Colo.
L. Rev. 1029 (1998).
43. Friedman, supra n. 37, at 189-92.
44. Friedman notes the movement away from efforts to make the criminal justice system more "humane"
after the 1960s. See id. at 404-06. Certainly, from the 1970s onward, retribution has been seen as a
increasingly legitimate function of the criminal justice system and there has been less willingness to accept
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has become a more than cottage industry among empirical social scientists.
45
Sociologists, economists, public health specialists, and citizens' groups engage in long
running battles over whether private gun ownership increases or deters violent crime.
4 6
But Friedman's usable past is not a law office history that facilely proves that the
death penalty does or does not deter murder, or that either the champions or opponents of
gun control are basically right or wrong. He briefly lets his views show on these and
other contemporary policy debates to be sure, but that is not where the value of his
efforts lie. Instead, Crime and Punishment brings a more than needed touch of context
and nuance to the debate over criminal justice policy. By doing a history of criminal law
and its administration that shows the evolution of criminal justice policy within the
broader context of the evolution of American culture, Friedman gives us a history that
produces a healthy skepticism toward what may be accomplished in this often-troubling
area. Crime and Punishment came out in 1993 as the crack cocaine connected
phenomenon of urban, youth, gang-related violence was beginning its awful rise. The
book was published two years after devastating riots in Los Angeles followed the police
beating of Rodney King. It was a time, like the present, of a strong association between
poor black men and violent crime. The public wanted reassurance, frequently in the
form of quick fixes. Politicians were quick to supply such.
And yet Friedman's history told us of the complexity of crime, and indeed, the
criminal justice system that was meant to control it. Perhaps crime rates might respond
to harsher or more frequent punishments, but the history of crime and punishment was
not necessarily reassuring on this point. Could these harsher or more frequent
punishments be applied within the framework of the criminal justice system that had
developed over three centuries of American history? How responsive to public outcry
was a system that had grown increasingly autonomous and bureaucratic, whose work had
become the product of professionals and not lay people over the last century likely to be?
Friedman also reminds us, that there was an even broader question: How much do the
American people want to tackle the problem of violent crime, and what are they willing
to give up to do so? In the abstract, public opinion might support the truncating of
certain civil rights or civil liberties to insure a greater degree of public order and perhaps
safety, but the public has proven to be far less willing to do so when faced with concrete
proposals that limit existing rights. Could the promiscuous use of the death penalty
complete with mandatory death sentences for specified crimes and draconian limitations
on appeals deter first-degree murder? Might mandatory long-term imprisonment for
medical or psychological explanations as excuses for criminal behavior. See John Braithwaite & Philip Petitt,
Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice 2-7 (Clarendon Press 1990); John Braithwaite,
Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 723, 723 (1982);
Marvin E. Wolfgang, The Medical Model Versus the Just Deserts Model, 16 Bull. Am. Acad. Psych. & L. 111,
111 (1988).
45. For an overview of some of that debate and how people who are not especially inclined toward
quantitative methodologies might approach it, see Robert J. Cottrol, Death and Deterrence: Notes on a Still
Inchoate Judicial Inquiry, in Statistical Science in the Courtroom 379-91 (Joseph L. Gastwirth ed., Springer
Pub. 2000).
46. Criminologist Gary Kleck provided a good guide to the social science and public health literature on
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repeat offenders deter recidivism? Would radical gun control, prohibition on ownership
of all or most types of firearms with severe penalties for violators lessen gun violence?
The efficacy of such proposals might be debated, but it is also clear that such proposals
and others that might be envisioned run counter to strong cultural and political
sentiments concerning individual rights and limitations on government within American
society. Friedman wisely cautions us that this culture of rights and sense of what is
proportionate punishment has to be taken into account in any development of alternatives
to current criminological policy. Friedman's insight in this regard takes on an even
greater vitality in the post-September 11 th world.
Whether looking at criminal justice in the limited context of late nineteenth-
century Alameda County or giving us a broad overview of criminal law and its
administration across the broad sweep of the nation's history, Friedman makes an
important contribution precisely because of his ability to integrate the legal and the
social. Crime and society's responses to crime involve law with the society's broader
culture in a way that no other area of the law can. At its base, criminal law and its
administration involve fundamental questions of a society's moral vision and the
mobilization of the public behind that vision. It also deeply involves questions of social
hierarchy and power. These are legal questions, but behind those legal questions stand
powerful questions concerning a society and its culture. The history of American
criminal law has benefited greatly from having Lawrence Friedman apply his skilled law
and society lens to a once neglected field in legal history.
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